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In this paper we prove that given a black box assumed to generate bits of a given non-recursive
real Ω there is no computable decision procedure generating sequences of decisions such that if the
output is indeed Ω the process eventually accepts the hypothesis while if the output is different than
Ω than the procedure will eventually reject the hypothesis from a certain point on. Our decision
concept does not require full certainty regarding the correctness of the decision at any point, thus
better represents the validation process of physical theories. The theorem has strong implications
on the falsifiability of physical theories entailing the failure of the physical Church Turing thesis.
Finally we show that our decision process enables to decide whether the mean of an i.i.d. sequence
of reals belongs to a specific ∆2 set of integers. This significantly strengthens the effective version
of the Cover-Koplowitz theorem, beyond computable sequences of reals.
PACS numbers: 02.10.A, 03.67.Lx
INTRODUCTION
Church-Turing thesis states that every function f :
N→N that is algorithmically computable is recursive or
equivalently computable by a universal Turing machine.
This is a mathematical statement about algorithms not
physical computers. This thesis has been supported by
the equivalence of all models of computations to date,
e.g., Turing machines, register machines and lambda cal-
culus [3]. A stronger thesis termed the physical Church-
Turing thesis is that every finitely realizable physical pro-
cess can be perfectly simulated by a universal Turing
machine operating by finite means (see [2], [9] and the
references therein). This thesis is much stronger. It has
been argued that there might be finitely realizable physi-
cal processes that can compute non-computable functions
e.g., by analog computation [15], stronger versions of
quantum computing [8],[5] or general relativity [13]. Fur-
thermore [9, 10] claims that some of the open problems
in physics (e.g., quantum gravitation) and the failure to
generate artificial intelligence might have underlying non-
computable physical processes. Similarly the possibil-
ity that some physical constants are non-computable has
been conjectured. If indeed a physical constant is non-
computable then more and more accurate measurements
of the constant (or repeated independent observations
with i.i.d noise) will provide us more bits of its binary
expansion, therefore providing an oracle that breaks the
physical Church-Turing thesis.
In this paper we discuss the empirical validation and
refutation of the hypothesis that a computing device gen-
erates a non-computable real number. Deutsch [2] argues
that this is hopeless since any finite experiment generates
a finite sequence of measurements with finite precision so
the output of any experiment is computable. However,
following Cover [1] we might envision a different strategy:
Our null hypothesis is that we are given a black box gen-
erating the bits of a specific non-computable real (In or-
der to be able to use the digits provided by the black box
we need to know what is the assumed outcome, otherwise
a random number generator will provide us almost surely
with useless bits of a non-computable real). We now per-
form an infinite sequence of tests, each sampling more
and more bits of the given black box. This measurement
procedure serves as an oracle, and our task is to refute
the null hypothesis if the oracle is a false oracle. The only
requirement we have is that if the oracle is a false oracle
(does not provide the bits of Ω) then from a certain point
our procedure always rejects the null hypothesis, and if
it indeed provides the bits of Ω then from a certain point
on we will always accept the hypothesis. This viewpoint
is in line with the idea of falsifying a physical theory [12].
Note that while our decisions are asymptotically correct
we are never certain about this fact. Since at any fi-
nite stage we might change our decision, we never get
full certainty regarding the null hypothesis, only growing
confidence. This is much like the validation process of
physical theories. The theory is accepted only if it is suf-
ficiently simple on one hand and has not yet been refuted
by experiment on the other hand.
Cover [1] used this strategy to verify that a mean of
a random sequence is rational. His motivation was to
provide tests for certain simple representations of well
known physical constants [4, 7, 16]. While at every fi-
nite stage any confidence interval contains rationals and
irrationals he shows that if the number is rational or is
irrational outside a certain set of measure 0 then with
probability one the sequence of decisions is correct from
a certain point on. Koplowitz [6] and later Peres and
Dembo [11] proved that if we want to test a hypothesis
regarding two sets contained in disjoint Fσ sets then the
correct decision is made with probability one for both
H1 and H0 and the set of measure 0 can be assumed
empty. However in all these papers little attention was
paid to actual computability of the decision procedures.
2The procedures are computable only if the countable se-
quence of reals is a computable sequence of computable
reals.
In this paper we apply the same decision concept to
testing the non-computability of physical constants (and
actually to any output of a physical black box) providing
us with a sequence of approximations to a real number.
We show that given the output of a black box which is as-
sumed to provide us bits of a given non-computable real
there is NO decision procedure (deterministic or proba-
bilistic) that makes an infinite sequence of decisions such
that any false oracle is detected from a certain point on.
The proof is general enough to apply to any physical
model of computation. It means that if the Church-
Turing thesis is true, than there is no way to experi-
mentally refute the hypothesis that a finitely realizable
process provides us a non-computable number. This type
of uncertainty requires us to choose between falsifiability
of such a physical prediction (which would be the most
substantial prediction of a theory claiming that a given
physical process is non-computable) and our belief in the
given theory. Hence accepting the failure of the physical
Church-Turing thesis implies that we need to revise the
notion of experimental refutation of physical theories as
proposed by Popper.
On the positive side we provide a computable deci-
sion procedure that almost surely decides asymptotically
whether the mean of an i.i.d random process belongs to
a given ∆2 non-computable set of natural numbers using
the asymptotic decision concept. Our result significantly
strengthens Cover’s result since ∆2 sets cannot be effec-
tively enumerated, and therefore Cover’s proof fails to
provide a computable decision procedure.
PHYSICAL PROCESSES, DECISION
PROCEDURES AND EXPERIMENT DESIGN
In this section we review the concept of an experiment
and a decision procedure to falsify a given prediction of a
physical theory. We focus on the experimental evidence
that the output of a black box is a non-computable real.
The formulation is sufficiently general to include statis-
tical decisions as well as deterministic procedures.
First we comment that basically any physical observa-
tion is subject to noise and finite accuracy limitations.
This implies that the best we can hope from an ex-
perimental devices is to obtain a sequence of measure-
ments with increasing accuracy rather than a single in-
finitely accurate measurement. However we do assume
that there is no practical limitation on the observation
and that by averaging we might reduce effects of obser-
vation noise as much as we would like (otherwise it would
be trivially impossible to decide anything regarding non-
computability, since any finite sequence is by itself com-
putable). Even this assumption ignores some inherent
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FIG. 1: A general decision process for refuting the null hy-
pothesis S = Ω
limitations on measurement such as the fact that certain
parameters cannot be simultaneously measured due to
quantum limitations, or fundamental limitations on syn-
chronization, etc.
We now provide some definitions and notations to be
used later in the paper.
Definition 1 1. For a finite sequence s =
〈s(0), s(1), ..., s(N − 1)〉 we denote the length
of the sequence by l(s) = N .
2. For two sequences s, t where l(s) ≤ l(t) we denote
s ≤∗ t if for all n < l(s) we have s(n) = t(n).
3. Let s be a sequence of integers (finite or infinite).
Let n ≤ l(s) then s↾n = 〈s(0), s(1), ..., s(n− 1)〉.
4. ω is the set of natural numbers and 2<ω is the bi-
nary tree of all binary finite sequences.
Let Ω be a non-computable real. We shall assume with-
out loss of generality that our real Ω is the characteristic
function of a non-computable set W . Suppose that as
in figure 1 a black box S, provides us at each experiment
n = 0, 1, 2, ... with a bit S(n). We would like at each stage
n to decide whether the bits provided by S so far are the
initial bits of our real Ω or not. We do not require that
all our decisions are correct, however we require that for
any S =< S(0), S(1), ... >, if S 6= Ω then from a certain
finite stage we decide correctly that S 6= Ω. Similarly if
S = Ω then we do not change our mind regarding this
and we accept the null hypothesis from a certain stage
onwards. Note that the decision procedure can be viewed
as a computable function F : 2<ω→{0, 1} where for any
s =< s(0), ..., s(N − 1) >
F (s) = 0 iff we decide that s 6≤∗ Ω. (1)
Let S be a source of bits. We measure the output of
S. A physical theory stating that S generates the bits of
a specific non-recursive real is experimentally falsifiable
if and only if there is a computable decision procedure
F : 2<ω→{0, 1} such that for every S, limn→∞ F (S↾n)
exists and
lim
n→∞
F (S↾n) = 0 ⇐⇒ S 6= Ω. (2)
The setup is presented in figure 1. We do not require that
we know whether S 6= Ω or not at any finite stage since
3any decision might be reversed after further observation.
However we do require that performing more and more
measurements of the output of S will eventually accept
the null hypothesis
H0 : S = Ω (3)
if it is valid or reject it from a certain point on if S 6= Ω.
This notion of verification is consistent with the way we
test physical theories in general [12]. We do not know
at any finite stage whether the theory is correct but we
require that the theory is falsifiable, i.e., if the theory is
wrong then there is an experiment falsifying the theory.
If the theory is false then from a certain point on our
experiments will refute the theory.
MAIN THEOREM
The asymptotic verification described above can be
utilized in all existing physical theories e.g., verifying that
the absolute zero is not achievable. This is not the case
with non-recursiveness. Our main theorem proves that
the non-recursiveness of the outcome of a finitely realiz-
able physical system implies a significant measurement
uncertainty in the sense that no experiment can be de-
signed to eventually refute or accept the prediction of the
theory. Interestingly theorem 4 provides an example of
asymptotic decision process regarding membership in ∆2
sets. Hence not all is lost regarding testing hypotheses
about non-recursive sets.
Theorem 2 Let W be a non-recursive set (e.g., the set
of Go¨del numbers of all halting Turing machines). Let
Ω = 1W be the characteristic function of W . Then there
is no computable decision procedure F : 2<ω→{0, 1} such
that limn→∞ F (S↾n) exisits and
lim
n→∞
F (S↾n) = 0 ⇐⇒ S 6= Ω (4)
Proof: Assume towards contradiction that we are given
a recursive F : 2<ω→{0, 1} such that (4) holds.
Claim 3 For every t define
Rt = {r|t ≤
∗ r ∧ F (r) = 1} .
If t 6≤∗ Ω then Rt is finite.
Proof of the claim: Assume that t 6≤∗ Ω and Rt is infinite.
Define a subtree Tt of 2
<ω by
Tt = {s|t ≤
∗ s ∧ ∃r ∈ Rt(s ≤
∗ r)} .
This is the subtree spanned by all extensions of t that are
decided the wrong way (since t 6≤∗ Ω). Since Rt is infinite
Tt is an infinite tree with finite branching. Therefore by
Ko¨nig’s lemma it has an infinite branch b. However for
every node s ≤∗ b there is an extension r ∈ b satisfying
F (r) = 1. Therefore
lim
n→∞
F (b↾n) 6= 0
contradicting the definition of F , since if S generates b
either we asymptotically acceptH0, i.e., we decide b = Ω,
which is false, or we change our decision infinitely many
times. This contradicts the definition of F and the claim
is proved.
We are now in position to finish the proof of theorem
2. Let m0 be sufficiently large so that F (Ω↾m) = 1 for all
m0 ≤ m. Such an m0 exists since by (4). By our claim
we have
t ≤∗ Ω ⇐⇒ ∀m (m0 ≤ m→∃s ∈ 2
m(t ≤∗ s ∧ F (s) = 1)) .
Let m1 = max{n,m0}. Then for all n
n ∈W ⇐⇒ ∀m (m1 ≤ m→∃s ∈ 2
m(F (s) = 1) ∧ s(n) = 1) .
Similarly for all n
n 6∈W ⇐⇒ ∀m (m1 ≤ m→∃s ∈ 2
m(F (s) = 1) ∧ s(n) = 0) .
Since all internal quantifiers are boundedW is both a Π1
and Σ1 set so it is recursive contradicting our assumption.
DECIDING THAT A MEAN BELONGS TO A
NON-COMPUTABLE SET
While in the previous section we proved that even given
a deterministic output of a black box we cannot define
a computable sequence of decisions asymptotically de-
ciding whether the black box provides us the digit of a
specific non-computable real, we show that certain deci-
sions regarding non-computable sets can be made. The
general properties of ∆2 sets can be found in [14].
Theorem 4 Let A ⊆ N be a ∆2 set of natural numbers.
Assume x1, x2, ... is a sequence of i.i.d real random vari-
ables with mean µ and variance σ2 <∞. Then there exist
a recursive decision procedure F : R<ω→{0, 1} such that
almost surely (with respect to realizations of the sequence)
lim
n→∞
F (〈x1, ..., xn〉) = 1 ⇐⇒ µ ∈ A (5)
Note that unlike the Cover Koplowitz theorem we do
not require that the set A admits a recursive enumera-
tion. This strengthens the effective version of the Cover-
Koplowitz theorem to ∆2 sets of integers.
Proof: Our decision procedure consists of two steps.
We First decide whether µ is an integer based on an
approach similar to the Cover-Koplowitz theorem using
that the set N admits a recursive numeration. Then we
4rely on the law of iterated logarithms to obtain an esti-
mate of µ and exploit the definition of A as a ∆2 set. To
test whether µ ∈ N let x¯N =
1
N
∑N
n=1 xn
be the sample mean and let σ¯2N =
1
N
∑N
n=1(xn− x¯N )
2 be
the sample variance. Almost surely x¯N→µ and σ¯
2→σ2.
Furthermore by the law of iterated logarithms almost
surely only finitely many times |µ − x¯N | >
√
σ2 log logN
N
and for every ε > 0 almost surely only finitely many times
σ2 > (1 + ε)σ¯2N (6)
Fix ε > 0. Let δN =
√
(1+ε)σ¯2
N
log logN
N
and µˆN =
round(x¯N ). If µ ∈ N then with probability one only
finitely many times µˆN 6= µ, and except finitely many
times this holds whenever |µˆN− x¯N | < δN If on the other
hand µ 6∈N then almost surely except finitely many N ’s
|µ− µˆN | > δN and therefore almost surely except finitely
many times |µˆN − x¯N | > δN Let 〈dn : n = 0, 1, ...〉 be a
sequence of decisions for the hypothesis HN0 : µ ∈ N given
by
dn =
{
1 if |µˆn − x¯n| ≤ δn
0 if |µˆn − x¯n| > δn
(7)
By the discussion above almost surely dn is correct except
finitely many times. If dn = 0 decide µ 6∈A. Otherwise we
assume that µ ∈ N and almost surely µˆn = µ for all but
finitely many n’s. Hence if dn = 1 assume that µn ∈ N.
We now define a procedure for testing whether µˆn ∈ A.
To that end recall that since A is ∆2 there are recursive
relations φ(m, k, n), ψ(m, k, n) such that
n ∈ A ⇐⇒ ∃m∀k[φ(m, k, n)]
n 6∈A ⇐⇒ ∃m∀k[ψ(m, k, n)]
(8)
Definition 5 An m0 such that ∀kφ(m0, k, n) is called a
witness for n ∈ A. An m0 such that ∀kψ(m0, k, n) is
called a witness for n 6∈A. m0 decides n ∈ A if m0 is a
witness for n ∈ A or for n 6∈A.
Obviously by (8) for each n either there is a
witness that n ∈ A or there is a witness for
n 6∈A. Therefore given n and m if we compute
〈(φ(m, k, n), ψ(m, k, n)) , k = 1, 2, ...〉 we must obtain
some k where either φ(m, k, n) fails or ψ(m, k, n) fails.
Moreover by definition there is a least m where one of
the formulas holds for all k.
Let µˆN be the estimate of µ given that dN = 1. Let
m0 be the minimal m such that only one of the formulas
fails for some k (assume without loss of generality this is
φ). Then with probability one except finitely many N ’s
∀k < N [φ(m0, k, µˆN)] (9)
and for sufficiently large N m0 is the minimal one. This
suggests the following decision procedure: Assume that
we have decided that at stage N that µ ∈ N (dN = 1).
Decide eN = 1 if the minimal m such that
∀k < N [φ(m, k, µˆN )] (10)
is smaller than the minimal m such that
∀k < N [ψ(m, k, µˆN )]. (11)
By the discussion above, if µ ∈ A then eN = 1 except
finitely many N ’s and if µ 6∈A, eN = 0 except finitely
many N ’s. This ends the proof.
Finally we comment that if we replace N by any count-
able recursive sequence of recursive reals S = 〈sn : n ∈ N〉
and A ⊆ N is ∆2 then we can extend the above result
to test whether µ ∈ 〈sn : n ∈ A〉. However similarly to
Cover’s result if the closure of S is uncountable then there
is a measure 0 subset of R\S on which the test might fail.
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